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Abstract: Although the safety production level at small scale enterprises is important 26 
for business success, critical safety interactions among the enterprises, its employees, 27 
the public, and the government have not been explained well in the literature. To address 28 
this gap, a bottom-up method of agent-based modeling is applied here that includes 29 
these key stakeholders. The study illustrates how employee protection-oriented safety 30 
proactivity behaviors, including whistleblowing and public exposure, can impact the 31 
safety production level at small scale enterprises, which are also watched by the public 32 
and regulated by the government. The results confirm that protection-oriented safety 33 
proactivity behaviors have a significant impact on the safety production levels at small 34 
enterprises through the interactions among multiple agents. The model results are 35 
validated using an employee questionnaire. The recommendation is for employees to 36 
encourage protection-oriented safety proactivity behaviors to improve safety 37 
production levels, and for the public and the government to provide additional safety 38 
support. 39 
40 
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1 Introduction 43 
In China, in 2014, there were 11.6987 million small scale enterprises (SSEs), 44 
accounting for 76.57% of all enterprises and more than 70 % of all jobs (China State 45 
Council, 2014). In the European Union, by contrast, SSEs accounted for 98.7% of all 46 
enterprises and employed 50.2% of all employees, with large and medium enterprises 47 
accounting for only 1.3% of the total number of enterprises, although they account for 48 
49.8% of total employment (Targoutzidis et al., 2014). In the United States, SSEs 49 
accounted for 95% of all enterprises (US Census Bureau, 2011). 50 
Obviously, SSEs are making a huge contribution to global economic development 51 
and employment. However, on-the-job fatalities and injuries continue to be problems 52 
for SSEs. Thus, it is not surprising that governments around the world are increasing 53 
their investments in safety intervention to improve safety levels. For instance, the 54 
Chinese government has implemented safety production standardization (State 55 
Administration of Work Safety, 2017), and the European Union and the United States 56 
governments have implemented the Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series 57 
(OHSAS 18001:2007) (British Standards Institute, 2007), the American National 58 
Standards Institute (ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012) (American National Standards Institute, 59 
2012), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary 60 
Protection Program (VPP) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2011). 61 
Most SSEs are unable to meet safety standards fully because of their management 62 
characteristics, such as limited resources, weak safety management practices, or a lack 63 
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of safety awareness (Hasle, 2000; Legg et al., 2014). SSEs have poorer occupational 64 
safety and health (OSH) conditions in general and higher accident rates than large and 65 
medium enterprises (Cagno et al., 2011; Micheli and Cagno, 2010). Thus, their safety 66 
management characteristics may be the main obstacle to maintaining and enhancing 67 
their safety production levels (Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Morse et al., 2004; 68 
Targoutzidis et al., 2014). 69 
Many studies have stated that improving the safety climate (Evans et al., 2005; 70 
Johnson, 2007; Pousette et al., 2008; Probst, 2004; Zohar, 2000; Zohar and Luria, 2005), 71 
safety leadership (Wu et al., 2008), safety management (Torp and Moen, 2006), and the 72 
workplace environment (Varonen and Mattila, 2002) may reduce the rate of accidents 73 
and injuries. Moreover, employee factors, such as safety knowledge (Burke et al., 2002), 74 
safety motivation (Neal and Griffin, 2006), and job satisfaction (Barling et al., 2003), 75 
may affect safety performance as well (Burke et al., 2002). To improve the safety level 76 
of production, it is apparent that all the key stakeholders, the SSEs, their employees, 77 
the public, and the government, must take action together. 78 
However, although safety performance has been analyzed, the safety interactions 79 
among the SSE, its employees, the public, and the government have not been explained 80 
well in the literature. Thus, there is a need for more research that models the interactions 81 
among these key players and the influence of these interactions on safety levels in a 82 
given environment. 83 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 84 
literature. Enterprise interviews are introduced in section 3. Agent attributes is 85 
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modeled in section 4. Simulated scenarios and model assumptions are described in 86 
section 5. Furthermore, model results are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 87 
concludes the paper. 88 
2 Literature Review 89 
In SSEs, occupational health and safety promotions are adequately present in 90 
different methods; however, there is a lack of comprehensive safety interventions 91 
(Micheli et al., 2010, Cagno et al., 2013, Cagno et al., 2014, Masi et al., 2014, Ozmec 92 
et al., 2015, Legg et al., 2014, 2015). The current, safety research on SSEs has focused 93 
on conceptual modeling verified with structural equation modeling methods. In order 94 
to better understand each stakeholder impacting safety production levels, the 95 
characteristics of stakeholders and their interactions must be modeled. Palaniappan et 96 
al. (2007) proposed an agent-based model to explain the interaction between workers 97 
and the impacts of their safety behaviors on the safety climate and productivity. An 98 
agent-based approach was proposed by Sharpanskykh and Stroeve (2011) to analyze 99 
safety culture in an air navigation service provider. Shapira et al. (2012) developed an 100 
integrative model by designed weights of each risk factor in order to quantify the safety 101 
level. According to cause-effect loops, the influence of owners, designers, contractors, 102 
supervisors and the government on safety levels was analyzed using system dynamics 103 
model (Zou et al., 2014). The interaction among project stakeholders was simulated in 104 
a construction safety climate using agent-based modeling (Awwad et al., 2016). 105 
Although the existing models are adequate in modeling stakeholders that affect 106 
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safety levels, they fall short in modeling the integrative agents whose behaviors and 107 
attributes impact the safety production level of SSEs. This objective of the study is to 108 
utilize a bottom-up method of agent-based modeling (ABM) to study protection-109 
oriented safety proactivity behaviors (EPOS-PB) by combining the stakeholders in the 110 
system and simulating their interactions. ABM is an effective technique to develop 111 
computational models of SMEs safety of production and dynamic interactions. Other 112 
methodological approaches cannot show the advantages because most of them are 113 
linear and non-dynamic. The simulation results show a dynamic evolution of the safety 114 
level. They also point to low-cost and highly effective safety interventions for SSEs and 115 
optimal safety strategies for policy makers. 116 
2.1 Employee protection-oriented safety proactivity behaviors (EPOS-PB) 117 
By definition, protection-oriented safety proactivity is characterized by creating a 118 
observable impact for the safety of organization. The scope of this behavior is to protect 119 
the organization from negative consequences associated with safety violations and with 120 
safety standard breakdowns. Examples of protection-oriented safety proactivity 121 
behaviours are stewardship (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2018), prevention oriented safety 122 
voice (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016) and whistleblowing (Conchie, 2013). This study 123 
focuses on whistleblowing as protection-oriented safety proactivity behavior and its 124 
associations with public exposure and turnover phenomena. 125 
By definition, whistleblowing occurs when employees report illegal or rule-126 
violating behaviors to authorities outside the organization to ensure external awareness 127 
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(Near and Miceli, 1985). Hofmann et al. (2003) defined whistleblowing from a safety 128 
perspective as reporting safety violations, instructing other colleagues to comply with 129 
safety regulations, familiarizing new team members with safety regulations, reporting 130 
colleagues who break safety regulations, and not tolerating colleagues who violate 131 
safety regulations. 132 
Whistleblowing may encourage employers to correct wrongdoings but may also 133 
damage an enterprise’s operations, reputation, and development. However, as the aim 134 
of safety whistleblowing is to prevent injuries and accidents before they happen, any 135 
enterprise operational damage may be ignored, as the results of injuries and accidents 136 
could be more destructive. 137 
Exposure and turnover are other EPOS-PB typically associated with 138 
whistleblowing, and that this study contributes to investigate how they can interact with 139 
safety proactivity. In this case, the employee exposes safety information to the public 140 
in order to protect colleagues’ and his/her own health and safety; moreover, he/she 141 
chooses to escape the risky workplace. 142 
2.2 Safety production level 143 
Finding effective and low-cost safety systems to improve the safety production 144 
level is becoming a critical safety issue, especially in developing countries. 145 
According to extant research (Janssens et al., 1995), three factors may impact the 146 
perception of the safety level at an enterprise: employees’ perceived management 147 
concerns, management’s consideration of safety, and management’s consideration of 148 
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production. The safety level may be higher if management’s consideration of safety is 149 
stronger. In contrast, the safety level may be lower if management’s consideration of 150 
production is stronger. The safety level may be impacted by additional factors, 151 
including environmental factors such as sociocultural values, political decisions, 152 
economic policies, and public policies. All of these factors may affect the 153 
implementation of OSH management and the safety level (Poole, 1986). Janssens et al. 154 
(1995) stated that the safety level of production was measured by safety performance, 155 
the OSH situation, and the safety of the workplace environment. Isla and Díaz (1997) 156 
measured the safety level based on three factors over 12 months: the level of safety in 157 
specific tasks, employees’ safety compliance behavior, and operators’ handling of the 158 
level of safety. 159 
By utilizing an analytic hierarchy process (AHP), Cagno et al. (2003) found that 160 
machines, operators, procedures, and the environment posed risks and caused safety 161 
issues. This risk essential method may be more practical to measure the overall safety 162 
level of production. Ayomoh and Oke (2006) proposed a new method of a hybrid 163 
structural interaction matrix (HSIM) to quantify factors that may affect the safety level 164 
of production. Therefore, we propose environmental factors, such as economic policies 165 
and safety laws in our ABM. 166 
2.3 Agent-based modeling 167 
ABM methodology is a complex dynamic system that consists of: a) distinct 168 
autonomous heterogeneous agents with different functions; b) behavioral rules 169 
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associated with the interaction among agents, which are introduced systematically and 170 
dynamically in the system (Bonabeau, 2002). A main characteristic of ABM is that the 171 
agents update their strategy based on changing interactions and a changing environment, 172 
an action that is not possible using empirical or other mathematical methods (Ren and 173 
Anumba, 2004; Valluri et al., 2009). ABM has been applied in various fields in the past 174 
two decades including economics, transportation, sociology, biology, marketing, and 175 
sales among others (Walsh et al., 2003). However, studies on safety behaviors and 176 
safety production levels are typically empirical or linear, limiting comprehensive 177 
analysis. ABM applies a bottom-up method that defines different agent strategies and 178 
attributes, and builds properties of the environment, allowing analysis of the 179 
interactions among agents in different periods (Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006). 180 
In addition, ABM can simulate what-if scenarios, allowing evaluations of the 181 
different options to shape enterprises strategies (Bonabeau, 2002). For instance, ABM 182 
can be used to propose a model and then change parameters to determine the responses 183 
to the changes. Awwad et al. (2016) simulated interactions among project stakeholders 184 
within a construction safety climate during both the bidding and construction phases. 185 
Lu et al., (2016) analyzed the interactions among a worksite, construction employees, 186 
and various types of safety investments to identify the interplay between safety 187 
investment and safety performance. In this study, we utilize ABM to analyze how 188 
employee EPOS-PB may have different impacts on the safety production level under 189 
specific environments. 190 
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2.4 Safety management characteristics of SSEs 191 
Relevant studies on SSEs have shifted from addressing safety hazards to safety 192 
intervention that may reduce accident rates (Legg et al., 2014). Although SSEs are 193 
heterogeneous, they share common business characteristics concerning the delivery of 194 
products and services, according with certain productivity standards and priorities 195 
(Laird et al., 2011). Based on studies of SSEs, SSEs employees may face a more risky 196 
workplace environment (Gunnarsson et al., 2007; Legg et al., 2014; Sørensen et al., 197 
2007), lower guarantee of OSH, and lower effective implementation of safety 198 
regulations and laws compared with large enterprises (Baldock et al., 2006; Lamm, 199 
1997). 200 
Owners of SSEs often play the role of managing safety; thus, all safety issues are 201 
personal decisions rather than based on specific directives (MacEachen et al., 2010). 202 
As owner-managers of SSEs often take total responsibility for both production and 203 
safety, they have little time to solve safety issues (Hasle et al., 2010). Obviously, the 204 
safety attitude of the owner-manager has a significant impact on the safety level of 205 
production. At the same time, owner-managers must deal with government safety 206 
regulations and laws that may create a negative effect on OSH and safety management 207 
(Baldock et al., 2006). 208 
As these businesses are heterogeneous, the owner-managers of the SSEs will have 209 
different attitudes and strategies for safety regulations and inspections that affect the 210 
safety levels (Vickers et al., 2005). Safety information is often limited and owner-211 
managers may lack the necessary experience or responses to solve safety issues and 212 
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face inspections (Hasle et al., 2010). Because of insufficient safety knowledge, 213 
resources and funds, there may be more safety issues among SSEs than in large and 214 
medium enterprises (Champoux and Brun, 2003; Gunnarsson et al., 2010). Recent 215 
studies in literature suggest that managerial intervention aimed to improve safety 216 
information sharing, a better knowledge of safety regulation guidelines and employees’ 217 
safety participation in the management of safety can help SSEs to enhance the quality 218 
of safety standards and the maturity of the safety system (Curcuruto & Griffin, 2018; 219 
Lehtinen, 2006). According with this recent trend in literature, Mei et al. (2018) also 220 
suggest that stimulating safety proactivity behaviors could positively impact safety 221 
management of SSEs. 222 
Overall, owner-managers of SSEs often have a poor understanding of OSH 223 
regulations and legislation, have limited capacity to identify risks and hazards, and may 224 
have negative attitudes to safety inspections (Schmidt et al., 2016). In this context, it is 225 
necessary to equate safety and production. 226 
Obviously, the improvement in safety levels at SSEs relies not only on the efforts 227 
of employees but also support from the public and the government. In this study, we 228 
utilize ABM to analyze the interactions among employees, SSEs, the public, and the 229 
government. 230 
3 Enterprise Interviews 231 
This study gathered data on the safety production levels in Chinese SSEs through 232 
semi-structured interviews with 105 high-risk SSEs. The literature review and reality 233 
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confirmed that there were more accidents and injuries among SSEs than among large 234 
and medium enterprises. According to safety regulations, owner-managers of SSEs are 235 
obliged to report safety occurrences and ensure safety reform. If accidents and injuries 236 
happen due to illegal production activities, they may also receive a punishment such as 237 
a fine or closure. Particularly, reports on safety occurrences are useful for safety 238 
analysis (e.g., statistics of accident or injury ratios and safety improvement for SSEs). 239 
Although safety reports are obligatory, in reality, not all occurrences are reported in a 240 
timely manner by owner-managers. At the same time, due to a lack of safety investment, 241 
SSEs suffer from a low safety level of production. As their emphasis is on survival and 242 
development, most SSEs fail to achieve the required safety standards. Therefore, in this 243 
study, in the context of SSEs, we model how they can make proper safety investment 244 
decisions and increase their safety level. 245 
The survey results indicated that most SSEs showed strong performance on the 246 
safety production level, which meant that their frequency of safety occurrences was 247 
significantly low. At the same time, safety investments among the SSEs were 248 
insufficient, not only due to a lack of safety awareness but also because of realistic 249 
constraints. Owner-mangers generally chose to conceal safety occurrences rather than 250 
report them because if they reported them, they would be required to compensate 251 
employees and pay a penalty to the government. Thus, insufficient safety investment 252 
could cause an adverse chain reaction. To reduce safety investment, a small number of 253 
SSEs even chose unsafe production. Employees facing safety risks have the civic right 254 
to expose or whistle blow, although most of them chose to keep silent. For these reasons 255 
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discussed above, employee EPOS-PB can play a significant role in improving safety 256 
production levels. In order to understand how to stimulate and support them, in the next 257 
section, we propose how to design and develop a formal model based on ABM 258 
methodology. In doing this, we will take in consideration all the major attributes of the 259 
agents contextually involved: SSE; employees; public; government. 260 
4 Modeling Agent Attributes 261 
4.1 Employee attributes 262 
The safety production levels at SSEs affect the employees’ OSH conditions. 263 
According to extant research (Ayomoh and Oke, 2006), when the safety level of 264 
production is low, the employee-perceived OSH level will also be relatively low. Thus, 265 
employee OSH will be threatened by risks and hazards that affect their workplace 266 
environment. In contrast, when the safety level is high, the employee-perceived OSH 267 
level will be relatively high; the OSH level of employees should be maintained within 268 
a stable range. Therefore, the employee-perceived OSH level related to safety level of 269 
production of SSEs i  in t  period. 270 
, *   i tOSH level Safety level of production  (1) 271 
where   is the random coefficient of the employee-perceived OSH level in the range 272 
[0.8, 1.2]. Based on cognitive bias, some employees may have a low perception of the 273 
safety level even if the safety level is high, while some employees may have a high 274 
perception of safety level even if the safety level is low; some employees may have the 275 
same perception as the actual safety level. Thus, the model sets a minimum value of 0.8 276 
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to represent a low-bias perception, a maximum value of 1.2 to represent a high-bias 277 
perception, and the value of 1 represents the same perception. 278 
The value of employee-perceived OSH level can be used to determine employees’ 279 
real value of safety production efficiency. This value means that employees perform 280 
daily production activities under a fixed level of safety, and the degree of the safety 281 
level of production will decide the safety efficiency for the employees. 282 
  *(  * )Safety production efficiency M OSH level    (2) 283 
where 0.22M  , 0.4  , and 0.6  . Small coal mine enterprises were chosen to 284 
determine the value of M  , which represents the efficiency coefficient without the 285 
influence of the OSH level.   and   were determined by the system design and 286 
repeated simulation experiments. 287 
4.2 Public attributes 288 
Social Networking Services (SNS) and Mass Media and Politics (MMP) offer 289 
opportunities for employees to expose safety information to the public. Thus, the public 290 
can obtain information directly from employees instead of owner-managers or safety 291 
news reports. An enterprise’s public reputation value can impact the purchase intention 292 
of customers and, subsequently, overall sales. Therefore, the sales of SSEs can be 293 
calculated as follows. 294 
, 1 1
, , 1 0 1
0, 1
*( *0.5 0.6)
0*( *0.167 0.8)
i t t
i t i t t t
ti t t
Sales SC R
Sales Sales SC R SC R
SC RSales SC



 
   
  
(3) 295 
where tSC  is the public reputation value in t  period, and the threshold values of 0R296 
and 1R  represent the degree of reputation value from employees, where 0 0.6R  and 297 
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1 0.8R  . When the reputation value is low, sales will be negatively influenced, and298 
when the reputation value increases, sales will increase correspondingly. When the 299 
public reputation is more positive, sales will meet normal market demand. The 300 
threshold and other values in equation (3) were determined based on the system design 301 
and repeated simulation. 302 
4.2 Government attributes 303 
Employees have civic rights to blow the whistle on SSEs that break safety laws and 304 
regulations or disobey OSH terms. Whistleblowing safety behavior can attract 305 
government safety attention; the national administration of production supervision has 306 
the responsibility to regulate safety production standardization and implement OSH 307 
policy. Meanwhile, the government evaluates the safety level of production at SSEs 308 
based on political and systematic standardization, employee reports, and public 309 
response. Consequently, the government puts in place a relevant political strategy 310 
according to different levels of safety. Ultimately, when the level of safety is below the 311 
standard, the government will require SSEs to identify risks and hazards and improve 312 
the workplace environment or be penalized if no action is taken. Similarly, when the 313 
level of safety meets or exceeds the requirement, the government will reward SSEs to 314 
maintain their performance. The reward and penalty system is shown as follows. 315 
, 0
0 , 1
,
1 , 2
2 ,
,
0,
,
,
i t
i t
i t
i t
i t
R System T
T System T
System
P T System T
B T System

     
 
(4) 316 
where the threshold values of 0T  , 1T  , and 2T  represent the reward and penalty 317 
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standards based on the level of safety; 0 0.6T  , 1 0.7T  , and 2 0.8T  . Specifically, 318 
where P  and B  are the reward values and R  is the penalty value. According to 319 
safety laws and survey results, the model determined B  = 50000, P  = 5000, and R320 
= 10000 and the threshold values of 0T  , 1T  , and 2T . It is difficult to examine the 321 
effects of different levels of rewards and penalties because of the complex system 322 
design. 323 
Furthermore, the government has the function of tax regulation. In order to 324 
encourage SSEs to improve the level of safety, the government adjusts the tax rate 325 
according to the level of safety as follows. 326 
, 0
0 , 1
,
1 , 2
2 ,
0.2,
0.15,
 
0.1,
0.05,
i t
i t
i t
i t
i t
System T
T System T
Tax rate
T System T
T System

     
 
(5) 327 
where ,i tSystem  represents the evaluation result of the safety level of production. 328 
Because of the complex system design, the tax rate was determined by the system, 329 
although it was difficult to show the tax rate in different simulations. 330 
Finally, based on the safety policy, the government evaluates the reliability of the 331 
whistleblowing information and, once confirmed, it rewards the employee. When 332 
, 0i tGC T , the whistleblowing reward value is as shown in equation (6). 333 
    0.1Whistleblowing reward value Safety production efficiency               (6) 334 
Equation (6) is utilized in the system, so it cannot be found in other equations in 335 
the model. 336 
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4.3 SSE attributes 337 
SSEs have functions such as production, selling, and profit. During the process of 338 
production, the safety level of production will affect the OSH conditions of employees, 339 
and then affect employee production efficiency. However, because of the characteristics 340 
of SSEs, most SSEs have a low level of safety compared to large and medium 341 
enterprises; thus, the safety level will significantly influence production. The 342 
calculation method is from the safety investment model described by Lu et al. (2016). 343 
, , ,  / (1 )i t i t i tSafety level of production K K                               (7) 344 
where ,i tK  is the safety investment and   is the control coefficient, and   = 0.33 345 
according to the system design and repeated simulation experiments. 346 
Safety and productivity are two key factors for SSEs. Most SSEs may consider 347 
safety and productivity as conflicting issues (Mitropoulos et al., 2005). Some SSEs may 348 
choose to reduce safety investment and produce in an unsafe way as they consider 349 
profits more important than safety (Hasle et al., 2012). According to the model, the 350 
safety production function is decided by the fixed product price ,i tFP , working time 351 
T , employee safety production efficiency SV , the number of employees EN , and 352 
sales PS (Walsh and Sawhney, 2004) as follows. 353 
, ,
1
 * * * *
n
i t i t
i
Safety production FP T SV EN PS

 (8) 354 
where ,i tFP  = 300 per unit, T  = 3 months, EN  = 40, and WE  = 3000 CNY per 355 
person. 356 
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4.4 Self-learning algorithm of SSEs 357 
Based on the economic situation, the model includes a self-learning SSE 358 
mechanism and the characteristic of bound rationality. To represent the subjectivity of 359 
SSEs, this study applies the self-learning algorithm so that the SSEs will change their 360 
safety investments according to the periodic evolutionary trend of the safety level of 361 
production (Ping et al., 2002). This self-learning algorithm includes intellectuality and 362 
automaticity, which maintain the status of effectiveness. Thus, it mimics more closely 363 
a realistic situation and enables SSEs to make decisions to change their level of safety 364 
investment. 365 
SSEs will make decisions after the end of each period based on two results: first, 366 
by evaluating the previous period, they decide if the safety level of production is 367 
increasing, decreasing, or unchanged during the current period, compared to the 368 
previous one; and second, they decide if profits are increasing, decreasing, or 369 
unchanged during the current period, compared to the previous one. After the two 370 
decisions, SSEs will adjust the probability of their safety investment (see Table 1). 371 
Table 1 Adjustment probability of safety level of production 372 
Safety investment Profit Probability 
Increase 
Increase ( / 2, , / 2)d i cp p p    
Decrease(or no change) ( / 2, , / 2)d i cp p p      
Decrease 
Increase ( , / 2, / 2)d i cp p p      
Decrease (or no change) ( , / 2, / 2)d i cp p p      
Unchanging Increase ( / 2, / 2, )d i cp p p    
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Decrease (or no change) ( / 2, / 2, )d i cp p p      
The system defines the probability vector of the safety investment adjustment as 373 
( , , )d i cp p p p  . Where, dp   represents the probability of a decreasing safety 374 
investment in the next period, ip  represents the probability of an increasing safety 375 
investment in the next period, and cp  represents the probability of an unchanged 376 
safety investment in the next period, where 1d i cp p p   . 377 
A change in the current strategy is based on the previous change in the safety level, 378 
and the change process reflects the self-learning mechanism. When the current strategy 379 
is completed, the system will randomly generate a number R  between 0 from 1 to 380 
decide which strategy the SSE applies. 381 
, 1 1,
, , 1 2
,t 1
0
,
, 1
d
i t
d d i
i t i t
d i
i
K I R p
K K I p R p p
K p p R



    
    
   
(9) 382 
where 1I and 2I  represent the increment and decrement of the safety investment. 383 
These two numbers are related to the safety level of production. The 2I of high and 384 
medium safety level SSEs is greater than the safety investment of low safety level SSEs, 385 
and the 1I  of low safety level SSEs is greater than the safety investment of high 386 
safety level SSEs. 387 
The safety production cost ,i tC  can be shown as the relationship of the labor cost 388 
,i tLC  and the production cost ,i tPC , and the safety investment ,i tK . 389 
, , , ,
1
n
i t i t i t i t
i
C LC K PC

   (10) 390 
Finally, based on the above analysis, the profit of the SSEs can be shown as follows. 391 
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, , , , ,
1
(1  )  
n
i t i t i t i t i t
i
F Tax rate Safety production C System

    (11) 392 
4.5 Modeling agent interactions 393 
As stated previously, whistleblowing can take different forms such as exposing 394 
safety information to the public and reporting the owner-managers who do not comply 395 
with the standards of safety regulations. When the public learns about safety incidences, 396 
the reputation of SSE is affected, which thereby influences the consumer purchase 397 
intention, and, thus, the sales of products. When the government receives a safety report, 398 
it implements a reward and penalty system according to the level of safety and also 399 
rewards whistleblowing behavior. In actual practice, employees could choose to leave 400 
or ask for a raise if they face poor safety conditions and owner-managers are not willing 401 
to address them. 402 
ABM includes three components: 1) properties, behaviors, and the environment of 403 
agents, 2) each agent’s interactions with the environment, and 3) the interactions among 404 
different agents (Macal and North, 2010). The schematic of the interaction process 405 
among these agents is shown in Fig. 1. 406 
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407 
Fig. 1. Interaction process among agents 408 
5 Simulated Scenarios and Model Assumptions 409 
5.1 Simulated Scenarios 410 
The environment is defined based on the characteristics of the SSEs and the 411 
parameters are as close to reality as possible including the number of employees, 412 
enterprise scale, the safety level of production, safety production efficiency, and gross 413 
safe production. 414 
Based on the fluctuation of the safety level of production, this paper presents five 415 
scenarios. The five scenarios simulate the interactions among the agents, including 416 
employee EPOS-PB, the fluctuation of the reputation value of the public reputation 417 
value and the dynamic regulation of the government. The scenarios aim to simulate 418 
reality to arrive at the optimal strategy. 419 
The five scenarios design the interaction between the employees and the SSEs. The 420 
safety level of production affects the OSH level of employees. The safety production 421 
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efficiency of employees is dependent on the perceived OSH level and employees 422 
choose different strategies about production activities. In Scenario 1, employees take 423 
no action to affect the safety level of production and do not voice their safety concerns 424 
in order to keep their positions. In Scenario 2, based on the perceived OSH level, 425 
employees expose safety occurrences through SNS and MMP, rather than blow the 426 
whistle to a government entity. In Scenario 3, employees directly blow the whistle to 427 
the government without relying on SNS and MMP. In Scenario 4, employees choose to 428 
expose safety occurrences to the public and blow the whistle; thus, the public and the 429 
government have a dual-effect in regulating the safety level of production. Finally, 430 
Scenario 5 reflects a more realistic situation; specifically, employees choose to leave, 431 
or if they insist on staying, they demand a raise, as the safety regulation of both the 432 
public and the government shows a non-immediate effect and owner-managers refuse 433 
to improve the workplace environment and OSH level for employees. In addition, high 434 
safety level SSEs will be able to recruit workers more easily; a current issue for SSEs 435 
is difficulty in recruitment. Thus, low safety level SSEs will find it difficult to recruit 436 
employees. 437 
5.2 Model assumptions 438 
Based on the literature, SSEs must solve OSH issues and safety investment will 439 
impact the safety level of production, which will then impact production and sales. 440 
Focusing on production, the agents have different attributes, for instance, the 441 
government can both inspect and regulate safety. When the level of safety reaches high 442 
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or medium, the SSEs receive a reward; on the other hand, if there is a low level of safety, 443 
SSEs will be penalized, required to fix the problem, or shut down (The Government of 444 
China, 2014). With the rapid development of social media, employees could expose the 445 
level of safety information to the public through SNS and MMP. In this way, the public 446 
will be made aware of the safety level of production of the SSEs and could affect the 447 
safety attitudes of owner-managers. ABM can be used to analyze the evolutional rules 448 
of the safety level under different environments with different interactions among the 449 
agents. The model assumptions are as follows. 450 
(1) To identify the interactions among the SSEs and other agents, we assume that the451 
number of SSEs is fixed and the number of employees is based on the characteristics 452 
of the SSE. 453 
(2) To simplify the multi-dimensional safety level of production, we consider the454 
degree of safety investment as a key factor that affects the safety level of production 455 
(Lu et al., 2016). 456 
(3) In the system, SSEs sales are impacted by the public and product prices are based457 
on the SSE scenario. 458 
(4) Based on the characteristics of the SSEs and the design of the system, we assume459 
that the increase and decrease in the ratio of the safety investment is controlled in a 460 
reasonable range. 461 
(5) According to China safety production standardization (General Administration of462 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China 463 
and Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China, 2016), we 464 
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assume that SSEs are divided into four types: first degree safety level of production 465 
1c  , second degree safety level of production 2c  , third degree safety level of 466 
production 3c  , and fourth degree safety level of production 4c  . 1c   and 2c467 
represent a high and medium level of safety, while, 3c  and 4c  represent meeting 468 
the standard and failing to meet the standard, respectively. 469 
6 Model Results 470 
To highlight the purpose of the experiment and the comparability of agents, the SSE 471 
safety level of production was divided into four sub-levels. In the model, the maximum 472 
and minimum safety production standardization values were maxSD   and minSD473 
respectively, with maxSD  = 100 and minSD  = 0. The government evaluation values of 474 
safety production standardization were defined as maxS and minS  . Thus, the safety 475 
level of production of SSEs was maxminmin max
min max
( , )SSs s s
SD SD
   . 476 
max min max min
max min max min
max min max min
min max min
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10 10
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(12) 477 
Two experiments were conducted to simulate the interaction among agents. The 478 
different scenarios illustrate the evolutionary trend of SSEs and the profit of the SSEs 479 
based on the interactions. 480 
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6.1 Evolutionary rules of the safety level of production in different scenarios 481 
The internal interactions between employees and SSEs and the external 482 
interactions with the public and the government show diversity and complexity. The 483 
safety level of production will present different forms. Thus, first, we simulated the 484 
evaluation number of the SSEs to identify the optimal strategic scenario. Fig. 2(a), (b), 485 
(c), (d) and (e) show the simulation trends of scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 486 
487 
Fig. 2(a) . Fig. 2(b) . 488 
489 
Fig. 2(c) . Fig. 2(d) . 490 
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491 
Fig. 2(e) . 492 
Fig. 2. Evolutionary number of SSEs in different scenarios 493 
Based on the simulations, in Scenario 1, where employees take no action, the 494 
evolutionary level of all types of SSEs was the lowest compared with the other four 495 
scenarios. When reaching a specific period, 1c  high-level safety SSEs reached zero 496 
quickly. Second, in Scenario 2, where employees expose information to the public, the 497 
evolutionary trend of 4c   low-level safety SSEs was obviously faster than that in 498 
Scenario 1. The 2c   medium-level safety SSEs maintained a steady trend and the 499 
highest position. The 1c  and 3c  (high- and standard-level) SSEs showed a similar 500 
evolutionary trend, which decreased with the periods. Third, in Scenario 3, where 501 
employees blow the whistle, the decreasing rate of the 4c  low-level safety SSEs was 502 
similar to Scenario 2. However, 1c , 2c  and 3c  (high-, medium-, and standard-level) 503 
SSEs showed a similar decreasing rate after the periods. Finally, Scenario 4, where 504 
employees expose and blow the whistle, and Scenario 5, where employee choose to 505 
leave or ask for a raise, show similar evolutionary trends. Specifically, the 4c  low-506 
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level safety SSEs show a closely related rate of decrease in both scenarios. Due to the 507 
addition of the agents, the interactions become positive, therefore, the fluctuation of 2c508 
medium-level safety SSEs was greater in both scenarios. After a short period, the trend 509 
of 1c  high-level safety SSEs becomes relatively stable and remains higher than the 510 
others. However, the SSEs are more likely to evolve into the 1c  type. 511 
6.2 Rules of profit fluctuation of SSEs in different scenarios 512 
To explain the profit trends, we constructed different scenarios to show how SSEs 513 
develop through the interactions of the agents. The SSE profit will change based on 514 
different agent actions; each scenario simulates one situation. As the interactions have 515 
five different agents, we cannot use a unified indicator to evaluate the changing profits, 516 
but we can identify the changing trend by comparing the interactions among the agents. 517 
518 
Fig. 3(a). Fig. 3(b). 519 
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520 
Fig. 3(c). Fig. 3(d). 521 
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Fig. 3(e). 523 
Fig. 3. Fluctuating profit of SSEs in different scenarios 524 
First, the SSE profit was the lowest in Scenarios 1 and 3, (no action and whistle 525 
blowing, respectively) relatively, among all scenarios. SSE with low safety level went 526 
bankrupt and exited the market. During the period, profit reached a high point and then 527 
began to decline. However, the profit was still far below zero. Second, the increase in 528 
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then started to decrease. However, the profit in Scenario 2 was smaller than in Scenarios 530 
4 and 5. Finally, Scenario 4 (exposure and whistle blowing) showed a fast increasing 531 
rate of profit initially, which then became more stable over the periods. In contrast, in 532 
Scenario 5 (employees leave or ask for a raise), the profit showed some fluctuation 533 
initially, then a rapid increase. In the middle and final periods, the profit trend continued 534 
to rise steadily. 535 
The simulation results show that when SSEs only consider productivity, employees 536 
remain silent about working conditions and the public and the government neglect 537 
supervision and regulation, with the result that SSEs have a lower level of safety. Under 538 
these conditions, there is no incentive to improve the safety level of production; thus, 539 
SSEs will remain at their current safety level of production and there is less probability 540 
that the level can evolve to a high or medium level. Furthermore, at a lower level of 541 
safety, employees suffer more risks and hazards. When injuries, accidents, or fatalities 542 
occur, the employees, reputations, and sales of the SSEs are affected due to public 543 
response and potential administrative penalties from the government. Thus, in the 544 
simulation, the SSE profit was extremely low when SSEs only focused on productivity 545 
and ignored the safety production. When the model added the reward and penalty 546 
system, we observed the beginning of the intention to improve safety production levels 547 
among the SSEs. When employee EPOS-PB were included in the model, the safety 548 
level of production reached its highest point and remained steady over the long term. 549 
550 
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6.3 Model validation 551 
The level of validity was determined by the results of the surveys and of the safety 552 
level of production of the SSEs. The questionnaire comprised a set of statements about 553 
employee EPOS-PB and safety level of production at the SSEs (Table 2). The 554 
questionnaire results showed the level of perception of employees on a scale from 1 555 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Employee beliefs on the impact of protective-556 
oriented safety proactivity on the safety level of production and related options were 557 
determined from the simulation scenarios stemming from the safety level of production 558 
survey results. 559 
Table 2 The questionnaire about employee EPOS-PB and safety level of production at 560 
the SSEs 561 
Item Description 
Q1 I believe that taking no action will positively impact the safety production 
level 
Q2 I believe that exposing safety occurrences will positively impact the safety 
production level 
Q3 I believe that blowing the whistle on illegal production behavior will 
positively impact the safety production level 
Q4 I believe that both exposing and blowing the whistle will positively impact the 
safety production level 
According to the comparison between the simulation results and the survey results, 562 
we introduced five classes of safety values: Very low, Low, Medium, High, and Very 563 
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high. According to the values of the simulated scenarios, the model and survey results 564 
are shown in Table 3.  565 
Table 3 The values of the simulated scenarios and the survey questionnaire 566 
Simulated 
Scenarios 
Model Survey Mean SD 
Scenario 1: 
Average impact of 
employees taking 
no action 
Very low Very low 1.78 0.797 
Scenario 2: 
Average impact of 
employees 
exposing safety 
occurrences 
Medium Medium 2.48 0.588 
Scenario 3: 
Average impact of 
employees 
blowing the 
whistle on illegal 
production 
behavior 
Low Low 3.63 0.615 
Scenario 4: High High 4.04 0.767 
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Average impact of 
employees both 
exposing and 
blowing the 
whistle 
Scenario 5: 
Average impact of 
employees adding 
turnover and 
demanding for a 
raise on the basis 
of Scenario 4. 
Very high - 
The comparison between the model and survey shows that the results are consistent. 567 
However, Scenario 5 could not be verified by the survey because we could not obtain 568 
information from employees who had already left their jobs. 569 
To validate the agent-based model between the agent and model scenarios, the 570 
results of the survey were used. The purpose of the survey was to acquire the employee 571 
perceptions through interviews with actual SSE employees. The model was validated 572 
through the comparison of the model and the survey. 573 
Simulated scenario results were matched with the survey results. Specifically, 574 
Scenario 1 shows the lowest impact on the safety level of production. Scenario 2 shows 575 
a medium impact due to the interactions between employees and the public. Scenario 3 576 
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shows a low impact as SSEs suffered a penalty or political punishment. Scenario 4 577 
shows a high impact with effects from both the public and the government. Scenario 5 578 
shows the highest impact not only on the basis of Scenario 4, but also due to the more 579 
EPOS-PB. 580 
7 Conclusion 581 
Currently, few researches focus on proactivity safety based on the method of ABM. 582 
Goh and Ali (2016) proposed a hybrid simulation framework of discrete event 583 
simulation, system dynamics, and agent-based simulation to demonstrate the relation 584 
between safety behavior and construction safety management. Lu et al. (2016) used 585 
agent-based model to analyze safety performance on a construction site based on a 586 
complex system defined by interactions among a worksite, workers, and safety 587 
investment. Agent-based approach was utilized to analyze the relation between an air 588 
navigation service provider and organizational safety culture by Sharpanskykh and 589 
Stroeve (2011). This study constructed an ABM of the safety level of production of 590 
SSEs using a bottom-up method closely related to employees, the public, and the 591 
government. 592 
The model validation was performed based the comparison between the simulation 593 
and survey results. The comparison showed that most model results were consistent 594 
with the results of the employees’ survey workshop. The survey results were used not 595 
only for the model input but also for the validity of the model results. However, 596 
Scenario 5 cannot be validated because of reality constraints. 597 
34 
 Based on the simulations of the interactions among the different agents, one 598 
significant finding was that rather than remaining silent, if employees pursue EPOS-599 
PB, they can help improve the safety level of production at their SSE. Another 600 
significant finding was that SSEs should not only target productivity but also a high 601 
safety level of production. As profit is the key goal necessary to survive and develop, 602 
owner-managers should equally value both safety and production, instead of having to 603 
reduce safety investment to maintain profits. 604 
At a practical level, the findings suggest that safety interventions should aim at 605 
focusing on EPOS-PB and the responsibility of the public and the government, which 606 
becomes the most effective in improving safety level production of SSEs. Specially, 607 
employees should consider safety as the core and basic requirement; they should not 608 
only blow the whistle immediately on illegal and unsafe production activities to the 609 
government but also report safety information to the public. When facing owner-610 
managers’ refusal in improving safety levels, employees should leave the job or demand 611 
for a raise to make additional efforts to improve the workplace environment. The public 612 
currently has few channels for employees to expose safety occurrences. Therefore, the 613 
public should offer specific SNS and MMP to allow employees to report safety issues. 614 
Furthermore, regarding policy makers, employees may experience ethics pressure if 615 
they choose to be a whistleblower. Thus, the government should install anonymous 616 
telephone hotlines and conceal whistleblowers’ information (Vinten and Gavin, 2005). 617 
The national government should simultaneously encourage employees to blow the 618 
whistle and formulate a series of laws and policies to protect whistleblowers. In addition, 619 
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a more humanized reward and penalty system can be designed; for instance, 620 
implementing a purely monetary awards and punishment mechanism could provide 621 
safety assistance to SSEs, such as purchasing safety services in a discount, pressuring 622 
owner-managers to implement OSH policy in a gentle way. The government should not 623 
only reward whistleblowers, but also provide policy guarantee to employees to make 624 
them feel safe about their workplace environment and OSH condition. Finally, the 625 
standard evaluation of the safety level for SSEs should be less strict, compared with 626 
that for large and medium enterprises. 627 
Improving the safety levels in SSEs is not only dependent on the efforts of owner-628 
managers but also on the combined efforts of employees, the public, and the 629 
government. The results from these simulations can be used to provide the public, 630 
policy makers, and owner-managers with information on how employee EPOS-PB can 631 
affect safety production levels for SSEs. The public, policy makers and university 632 
research teams can practically use this ABM model. Specifically, the results can give 633 
the changing safety trend of SSEs for the public, different ratio regulations and safety 634 
regulation for policy makers, and safety researches for university research teams. 635 
The study has some limitations. First, the ABM is abstracted from real-world SSEs 636 
and it cannot simulate fully all factors related to the current market situation. Second, 637 
the model could be better integrated. Finally, this study does not consider additional 638 
agents, such as labor unions or financing institutions. In future work, the model could 639 
be modified to add more agents and build more impact factors to make the model more 640 
realistic. 641 
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